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ABSTRACT
We study linear-quadratic stochastic differential games on directed chains inspired by the directed
chain stochastic differential equations introduced by Detering, Fouque & Ichiba [3]. We solve ex-
plicitly for Nash equilibria with a finite number of players and we study more general finite-player
games with a mixture of both directed chain interaction and mean field interaction. We investigate
and compare the corresponding games in the limit when the number of players tends to infinity.
The limit is characterized by Catalan functions and the dynamics under equilibrium is an infinite-
dimensional Gaussian process described by a Catalan Markov chain, with or without the presence
of mean field interaction.
Key Words and Phrases: Linear-quadratic stochastic games, directed chain network, Nash equilibrium, Catalan func-
tions, Catalan Markov chain, mean field games.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic differential games on networks is a broad area. There are two extreme situations. On one hand, we can
consider a fully connected network with interaction of mean-field type. When the number of players goes to infinity,
this kind of game can be approximated by a mean field game. The mean field convergence problem has been discussed
widely, for instance in Lacker [4]. Other networks and games have been proposed and studied. For example, Delarue
[2] investigates an example of a game with a large number of players in mean-field interaction when the graph connec-
tion between them is of Erdos-Re´nyi type, and Lacker, Ramanan & Wu [5] study the limit of an interacting diffusive
particle system on a large sparse interaction graph with finite average degree. On the other hand, we can consider
a very structured network such as a one-dimensional directed chain which has been studied in Detering, Fouque &
Ichiba [3] without the game aspect. It is a complete opposite to mean field games since, on a directed chain network,
each player interacts with its neighbor in a given direction. In this paper, we introduce a game aspect of the directed
chain and identify Nash equilibria. We also consider the limit when the number of players goes to infinity.
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Interestingly, the equilibrium dynamics on the network discussed in this paper turns out to be different from the
dynamics suggested in [3], in particular, with long time variance behavior. The equilibrium dynamics for the infinite-
player game is described by a Catalan Markov chain introduced in this paper.
Our first goal is to consider a game on a directed chain network and to find its Nash equilibrium. We focus on open-
loop Nash equilibria. We want to understand how the structure of the network affects this Nash equilibrium. We
propose three directed chain networks shown in Figures 1 and 2. Starting from a finite directed chain, we also discuss
a periodic directed chain in a ring structure and we compare with the game on a infinite directed chain network.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we propose a finite-player game model on a directed chain and
construct an open-loop Nash equilibrium. We discuss general boundary conditions as well as two special cases to
illustrate that the boundary condition actually affects weakly the Nash equilibrium. We also observe that for this type
of games open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria coincide. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of an infinite-player
stochastic differential game on a directed chain. We try to find an open-loop Nash equilibrium and get a similar Riccati
system to that of the finite-player game. The solutions are called Catalan functions and we use them to build a Catalan
Markov chain, discussed in section 4. We find that its long-time asymptotic variance and covariance are finite. In
sections 5 and 6, we discuss the finite-player and infinite-player games for a mixed system including both a directed
chain interaction and a mean-field interaction. We can adjust the model to be a purely mean field game (studied in
[1]), or a purely directed chain game, or a mixture of the two by introducing a tuning parameter u ∈ [0, 1]. We repeat
the same steps as sections 2, 3, and 4 to find the Nash equilibria and we construct a generalized Catalan Markov chain
describing the two effects. We find that the long-time asymptotic variance of the process with the purely directed
chain interaction is finite, which is different from the case with mean-field interaction as shown in Table 1 in [3]. In
section 7, we propose a finite-player periodic directed chain game and we construct an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
We conjecture that its infinite-player limit is the same as the one found for other boundary condition. This conjecture
is supported by numerical results. In Section 8, we extend our results to tree structures with fixed finite number
of descendants. Section 9 gives a conclusion and open problems. Appendix A includes some technical proofs and
discussions.
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Figure 1: Finite Directed Chain (Left) and Infinite Directed Chain (Right)
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Figure 2: Periodic Directed Chain
2
2 N-Player Directed Chain Game
2.1 Setup and Assumptions
We consider a stochastic game in continuous time, involving N players indexed from 1 to N . Each player i is
controlling its own, real-valued private state Xit by taking a real-valued action α
i
t at time t ∈ [0, T ]. The dynamics of
the states of the N individual players are given by N stochastic differential equations of the form:
dXit = α
i
tdt+ σdW
i
t , i = 1, · · · , N, (1)
where 0 ≤ t ≤ T and (W it )0≤t≤T , i = 1, · · · , N are independent standard Brownian motions. Here and throughout
the paper, the argument in the superscript represents index or label but not the power. For simplicity, we assume that
the diffusion is one-dimensional and the diffusion coefficients are constant and identical denoted by σ > 0. The drift
coefficients αi’s are adapted to the filtration of the Brownian motions and satisfyE[
∫ T
0
|αit|2dt] <∞ for i = 1, . . . , N .
The system starts at time t = 0 from i.i.d. square-integrable random variables Xi0 = ξi, independent of the Brownian
motions and, without loss of generality, we assume E(ξi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N .
In this model, among the first N − 1 players, each player i chooses its own strategy αi, in order to minimize its
objective function given by:
1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 : J i(α1, · · · , αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
(
1
2
(αit)
2 +

2
(Xi+1t −Xit)2
)
dt+
c
2
(Xi+1T −XiT )2
}
, (2)
for some constants  > 0 and c ≥ 0. The running cost and the terminal cost functions are defined by
f i(x, αi) =
1
2
(αi)2 +

2
(xi+1 − xi)2, and gi(x) = c
2
(xi+1 − xi)2, (3)
respectively for x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ RN and αi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N . This is a Linear-Quadratic differential game
on a directed chain network, since the state Xi of each player i interacts only with Xi+1 through the quadratic cost
functions for i = 1, . . . , N − 1. The system is completed by describing the behavior of player N which will be done
in the following section, when we discuss the boundary condition of the system.
2.2 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we search for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the system of N players among the admissible strate-
gies {αit, i = 1, · · · , N, t ∈ [0, T ]} and we study the effect of boundary conditions induced by the behavior of player
N . We will discuss a general boundary condition for the game first in Section 2.2.1 and then show two particular
choices in Section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. We construct the equilibrium by the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle.
2.2.1 General Boundary Condition
We consider a setup with a general boundary condition for the directed chain where the last player N does not depend
on the other players. The expected cost functional for player N is defined by:
JN (αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
(
1
2
(αNt )
2 + q2(X
N
t )
)
dt+Q2(X
N
T )
}
, (4)
where q2(x) =
a1
2
(x−m)2 + a2, and Q2(x) = c1
2
(x−m)2 + c2, x ∈ R (5)
are non-degenerate convex quadratic functions in x, where a1, a2,m, c1, c2 are some constants with a1 > 0 and
c1 > 0. The running cost function is defined by fN (x, αN ) = 12 (α
N )2 + q2(x) and the terminal cost function is
defined by gN (x) = Q2(x). This can be seen as a control problem for the player N and we assume its state is
attracted to some constant level m ∈ R.
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The Hamiltonian for player i ≤ N − 1 is given by:
Hi(x1, · · · , xN , yi,1, · · · , yi,N , α1, · · · , αN ) =
N∑
k=1
αkyi,k +
1
2
(αi)2 +

2
(xi+1 − xi)2,
while the Hamiltonian for player N is:
HN (x1, · · · , xN , yi,1, · · · , yi,N , α1, · · · , αN ) =
N∑
k=1
αkyi,k +
1
2
(αN )2 +
a1
2
(xN −m)2 + a2
for xk, yi,k, αk ∈ R, i, k = 1, . . . , N . For i = 1, . . . , N the value of αi minimizing the Hamiltonian Hi(·) with
respect to αi, when all the other variables including αj for j 6= i are fixed, is given by the first order condition
∂αiH
i = yi,i + αi = 0 leading to the choice: αˆi = −yi,i.
The adjoint processes Y it = (Y
i,j
t ; j = 1, · · · , N) and Zit = (Zi,j,kt ; j = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · , N) for i = 1, · · · , N
are defined as the solutions of the system of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs): for j = 1, . . . , N
i ≤ N − 1 :

dY i,jt = −∂xjHi(Xt, Y it , αt)dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t
= −(Xi+1t −Xit)(δi+1,j − δi,j)dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Y i,jT = ∂xjgi(XT ) = c(X
i+1
T −XiT )(δi+1,j − δi,j);
i = N :
 dY N,jt = −a1(XNt −m)δN,jdt+
N∑
k=1
ZN,j,kt dW
k
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Y N,jT = c1(X
N
T −m)δN,j .
(6)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Particularly, for j = i, j = i+ 1, it becomes:
dY i,it = (X
i+1
t −Xit)dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,i,kt dW
k
t , Y
i,i
T = −c(Xi+1T −XiT ), i ≤ N − 1,
dY i,i+1t = −(Xi+1t −Xit)dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,i+1,kt dW
k
t , Y
i,i+1
T = c(X
i+1
T −XiT ), i ≤ N − 1,
dY N,Nt = −a1(XNt −m)dt+
N∑
k=1
ZN,N,kt dW
k
t , Y
N,N
T = c1(X
N
T −m).
(7)
Thus, because of Y i,iT = −Y i,i+1T and of the form of dynamics, it is reduced to
Y i,it = −Y i,i+1t , Zi,i,kt = −Zi,i+1,kt (8)
for i ≤ N − 1, k ≤ N, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . For j 6= i, i+ 1, i ≤ N − 1, it becomes: dY i,jt =
∑N
k=1 Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t , Y
i,j
T = 0,
and hence, the solution is
Y i,jt ≡ 0 , Zi,j,kt ≡ 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (9)
Considering the BSDE system (7) and its terminal condition, we make the ansatz:
Y i,it =
N−1∑
j=i
φN,i,jt X
j
t + (φ
N,i,N
t X
N
t + ψ
N,i
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
affine inXN , depending on B.C.
=
N∑
j=i
φN,i,jt X
j
t + ψ
N,i
t , (10)
for some deterministic scalar functions φt (depending on N ) satisfying the terminal conditions: for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
φN,i,iT = c, φ
N,i,i+1
T = −c, φN,i,jT = 0 for j ≥ i+ 2, ψN,iT = 0; and φN,N,NT = c1, ψN,NT = −c1m. With this ansatz,
the optimal strategy αˆ· and the controlled forward equation for X· in (1) become
αˆit = −Y i,it = −
( N∑
j=i
φN,i,jt X
j
t + ψ
N,i
t
)
,
dXjt = −
( N∑
k=j
φN,j,kt X
k
t + ψ
N,j
t
)
dt+ σdW jt .
(11)
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Differentiating the ansatz (10) and substituting (11) leads to:
dY i,it =
N∑
j=i
[Xjt φ˙
N,i,j
t dt+ φ
N,i,j
t dX
j
t ] + ψ˙
N,i
t dt
=
{ N∑
k=i
(
φ˙N,i,kt −
k∑
j=i
φN,i,jt φ
N,j,k
t
)
Xkt +
[
ψ˙N,it −
N∑
j=i
ψN,jt φ
N,i,j
t
]}
dt+ σ
N∑
k=i
φN,i,kt dW
k
t .
(12)
Here φ˙t represents the time derivative of φt. Comparing the martingale parts and drifts of two Itoˆ’s decompositions
(7) and (12) of Y i,it , the martingale terms give the deterministic (and therefore adapted) processes Z
i,i,k
t :
Zi,i,kt = 0 for k < i, and Z
i,i,k
t = σφ
N,i,k
t for k ≥ i. (13)
Moreover, the drift terms show that the functions φN,·,·t and ψ
N,·
t must satisfy the system of Riccati equations :
for i ≤ N − 1,
φ˙N,i,it = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,it − , φN,i,iT = c,
φ˙N,i,i+1t = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,i+1t + φN,i,i+1t · φN,i+1,i+1t + , φN,i,i+1T = −c,
...
φ˙N,i,`t = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,`t + φN,i,i+1t · φN,i+1,`t
+ · · ·+ φN,i,`−1t · φN,`−1,`t + φN,i,`t · φN,`,`t , φN,i,`T = 0,
...
φ˙N,i,N−1t = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,N−1t + · · ·+ φN,i,N−1t · φN,N−1,N−1t , φN,i,N−1T = 0,
φ˙N,i,Nt = φ
N,i,i
t φ
N,i,N
t + · · ·+ φN,i,N−1t φN,N−1,Nt + φN,i,Nt φN,N,Nt , φN,i,NT = 0;
(14)
for i = N ,
φ˙N,N,Nt = φ
N,N,N
t · φN,N,Nt − a1, φN,N,NT = c1;
and ψN,j· , j ≤ N are determined by
ψ˙N,it =
N∑
j=i
ψN,jt φ
N,i,j
t , ψ
N,i
T = 0,
...
ψ˙N,N−1t = ψ
N,N−1
t φ
N,N−1,N−1
t + ψ
N,N
t φ
N,N−1,N
t , ψ
N,N−1
T = 0,
ψ˙N,Nt = ψ
N,N
t φ
N,N,N
t + a1m, ψ
N,N
T = −c1m.
(15)
From the equations above, the functions φN,i,it for all i = 1, · · · , N − 1 are identical; the functions φN,i,i+1t for
all i = 1, · · · , N − 2 are identical ;· · · ; and the functions φN,i,N−2t = φN,i+1,N−1t . The functions φN,i,Nt for
all i depend on φN,N,Nt of the last player which is determined by the boundary condition. However, the functions
φN,i,it , · · · , φN,i,N−1t are independent of φN,i,Nt and the boundary condition. The functions ψN,· depend on the φ
functions and have no effect on φN,i,j (j < N ) as well.
In conclusion, these φN,i,j (j < N) functions are solvable, identical and independent of the boundary condition
as long as the boundary condition defines the last player as a self-controlled problem. The preceding argument is
summarized as the following proposition.
Proposition 1. An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic stochastic game with cost functionals (2)-
(3) for the first N − 1 players and (4)-(5) for the N th player is given by (11), where φN,i,j· and ψN,j are uniquely
determined by the system (14)-(15) of Riccati equations.
As the number of players goes to infinity, we can get rid of the boundary condition and get a sequence of functions
{φjt , j = 1, 2, · · · }, defined by φ0t = φN,i,it , φ1t = φN,i,i+1t , · · · , φjt = φN,i,i+jt for large N and so on. It indicates
that the Nash equilibrium converges to a limit independent of the boundary condition. Therefore, it is natural to study
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a similar game with infinite players and we conjecture that the limit of the Nash equilibrium of the finite-player game
gives us the Nash equilibrium of the infinite-player game. And the sequence of functions {φjt , i ∈ N} is the solution
to the Riccati equation system of the infinite-player game. This will be discussed in Section 3. Next, two particular
examples are discussed to better illustrate the effect of the special boundary condition.
2.2.2 Boundary Condition 1: XN is attracted to 0
Here, we discuss the case when XN is attracted to 0 which is also the common mean E[ξi] = 0 of the initial
condition. It is equivalent to the general boundary condition (4)-(5) with m = 0. Without loss of generality, we can
take constants: a1 = , c1 = c and a2 = c2 = 0. Then the cost functional for player N is given by:
JN (αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
(
1
2
(αNt )
2 +

2
(XNt )
2
)
dt+
c
2
(XNT )
2
}
.
The running cost function is defined by fN (x, αN ) = 12 (α
N )2 + 2x
2 and the terminal cost function is defined by
gN (x) = c2c
2. Then, XN is independent of the other players and is the solution of a self-controlled problem. We then
make the same ansatz as (10) with ψN,it = 0 for all i, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . As a result, the martingale terms give the same
processes Zi,i,kt as (13). And from the drift terms, we obtain the system of Riccati equations:
for i ≤ N − 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
φ˙N,i,it = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,it − , φN,i,iT = c,
φ˙N,i,i+1t = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,i+1t + φN,i,i+1t · φN,i+1,i+1t + , φN,i,i+1T = −c,
...
φ˙N,i,lt = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,lt + φN,i,i+1t · φN,i+1,lt + · · ·+ φN,i,l−1t · φN,l−1,lt + φN,i,lt · φN,l,lt , φN,i,lT = 0,
...
φ˙N,i,Nt = φ
N,i,i
t φ
N,i,N
t + φ
N,i,i+1
t φ
N,i+1,N
t + · · ·+ φN,i,N−1t φN,N−1,Nt + φN,i,Nt φN,N,Nt , φN,i,NT = 0;
for i = N , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
φ˙N,N,Nt = φ
N,N,N
t · φN,N,Nt − , φN,N,NT = c,
From above, we have the same conclusion: the functions φN,i,i+kt = φ
N,j,j+k
t for all i, j ≥ 1, k ≥ 1 and i + k <
N, j + k < N ; and functions φN,i,jt (j < N ) are independent of the boundary condition.
Remark 1. Notice that in this case φN,N,Nt has the same solution as φ
N,i,i
t (i < N ). Thus, in the ansatz (10), we can
actually assume the solution φN,i,j· depends only on the difference j − i for j ≥ i.
2.2.3 Boundary Condition 2: αN = 0
We study the case when there is no control for the last player XN , i.e. the dynamics of the state is given by:
dXNt = σdW
N
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; XN0 = ξN , E(ξN ) = 0.
Player i chooses the strategy αit (i < N ) to minimize J
i given in (2) and the last player does not control, i.e., αN· ≡ 0.
We make the same ansatz as in (10) with ψN,it = 0 for all i. Then the martingale terms give the same processes Z
i,i,k
t
as in (13) for i ≤ N , k ≤ N , 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
From the drift terms, we get the system of Riccati equations :
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for i ≤ N − 1,
φ˙N,i,it = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,it − , φN,i,iT = c,
φ˙N,i,i+1t = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,i+1t + φN,i,i+1t · φN,i+1,i+1t + , φN,i,i+1T = −c,
...
φ˙N,i,lt = φ
N,i,i
t · φN,i,lt + φN,i,i+1t · φN,i+1,lt + · · ·+ φN,i,l−1t · φN,l−1,lt + φN,i,lt · φN,l,lt , φN,i,lT = 0,
...
φ˙N,i,N−1t = φ
N,i,i
t φ
N,i,N−1
t + φ
N,i,i+1
t φ
N,i+1,N−1
t + · · ·+ φN,i,N−1t φN,N−1,N−1t , φN,i,N−1T = 0,
φ˙N,i,Nt =
N−1∑
j=i
φN,i,jt φ
N,j,N
t
= φN,i,it φ
N,i,N
t + φ
N,i,i+1
t φ
N,i+1,N
t + · · ·+ φN,i,N−1t φN,N−1,Nt , φN,i,NT = 0;
for i = N ,
φ˙N,N,Nt = −, φN,N,NT = c,
From above, it is demonstrated again that the boundary condition does not affect the solutions φN,i,j· (j < N ), however,
the functions φN,i,N· for all i are different from those in Section 2.2.2, which are dependent on the boundary condition.
2.3 Closed-loop Nash Equilibrium
In search for closed-loop Nash equilibria, the controls are of the form αk(t, x). When computing ∂xjHi in the
derivation of the BSDE for Y i,j , one needs to pay attention in taking derivatives with respect to xj in αˆk for k 6= i,
using αˆk = −yk,k and the ansatz (20). This is a tedious but straightforward computation which leads to the fact that
the obtained closed-loop equilibrium coincides with the open-loop equilibrium identified before. We omit the details
here as well as repeating this remark in the following sections. The only place where closed-loop and open-loop
equilibria will be different is in Section 5 when we will look at a mixture of directed chain and mean field interactions
for finite player games, as it is already the case for pure mean field interaction studied in [1]. However, they will
coincide again for the infinite-player games in Section 6.
3 Infinite-Player Game Model
Motivated by the limit of the finite-player game discussed in Section 2, we define the game with infinite players on
a directed chain structure as shown in Figure 1. In Remark 2 in Section 3.1, we will see that the Hamiltonian only
depends on finite players, which will make it well-defined. We assume that the state dynamics of all players are given
by the stochastic differential equations of the form: for i ≥ 1,
dXit = α
i
tdt+ σdW
i
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (16)
where (W it )0≤t≤T , i ≥ 1 are one-dimensional, independent Brownian motions. Similar to the setup for the finite-
player games in Section 2, we assume that the drift coefficients αi are adapted to the filtration of the Brownian motions
and satisfy E[
∫ T
0
|αit|2dt] < ∞. We also assume that the diffusion coefficients are constant and identically denoted
by σ > 0. The system starts at time t = 0 from i.i.d. square-integrable random variables Xi0 = ξi with E(ξi) = 0,
independent of the Brownian motions. In this model, player i chooses its own strategy αi in order to minimize its
expected cost function of the form:
J i(α) = E
[ ∫ T
0
f i(Xs, α
i
s)ds+ g
i(XT )
]
, (17)
where the running and terminal cost functions f i(x, αi), gi(x) are the same as in (3).
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3.1 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
We search for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the infinite system (16) among admissible strategies {αit, i =
1, 2, · · · , 0 ≤ t ≤ T}. First, we define the Hamiltonian Hi of the form:
Hi(x1, x2, · · · , yi,1, · · · , yi,ni , α1, α2, · · · ) =
ni∑
k=1
αkyi,k +
1
2
(αi)2 +

2
(xi+1 − xi)2, (18)
assuming it is defined on real numbers xi, yi,k, αi, i ≥ 1, k ≥ 1, where only finitely many yi,k are non-zero for every
given i. Here, ni is a finite number depending on i with ni > i. This assumption is checked in Remark 2 below. Thus,
the Hamiltonian Hi is well defined for i ≥ 1.
The adjoint processes Y it = (Y
i,j
t ; j = 1, · · · , ni) and Zit = (Zi,j,kt ; 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, k ≥ 1) for i ≥ 1 are the solutions of
the system of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs): for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i ≥ 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni,
dY i,jt = −∂xjHi(Xt, Y it , αt)dt+
∞∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t
= −(Xi+1t −Xit)(δi+1,j − δi,j)dt+
∞∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t ,
Y i,jT = ∂xjgi(XT ) = c(X
i+1
T −XiT )(δi+1,j − δi,j).
(19)
Remark 2. For every j 6= i or i + 1, dY i,jt =
∑∞
k=1 Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t and Y
i,j
T = 0 implies Z
i,j,k
t = 0 for all k. This
observation is consistent with (9) in the finite player game case. Note also that Y i,i+1 = Y i,i. There must be finitely
many non-zero Y i,j’s for every i. Hence, the Hamiltonian Hi in (18) can be rewritten as
Hi(x1, x2, · · · , yi,i, yi,i+1, α1, α2, · · · ) = αiyi,i + αi+1yi,i+1 + 1
2
(αi)2 +

2
(xi+1 − xi)2.
By minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to αi, we may obtain αˆi = −yi,i for all i. Inspired by the conclusion
from the finite-player game (see also Remark 1), we then make the ansatz of the form:
Y i,it =
∞∑
j=i
φj−it X
j
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T (20)
for some deterministic scalar functions φit satisfying the terminal conditions: φ
0
T = c, φ
1
T = −c, φiT = 0 for i ≥ 2.
Substituting the ansatz (20), the optimal strategy αˆi and the forward equation for Xi· in (16) are
αˆit = −Y i,it = −
∞∑
j=i
φj−it X
j
t , dX
i
t = −
∞∑
j=i
φj−it X
j
t dt+ σdW
i
t (21)
for i ≥ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Differentiating the ansatz (20), we obtain
dY i,it =
∞∑
j=i
[Xjt φ˙
j−i
t dt+ φ
j−i
t dX
j
t ]
=
∞∑`
=0
φ˙`tX
i+`
t dt−
∞∑`
=0
( ∑`
j=0
φjtφ
`−j
t
)
Xi+`t dt+ σ
∞∑`
=i
φ`−it dW
`
t .
(22)
Now we compare the two Itoˆ’s decompositions (22) and (19) of Y i,it . The martingale terms give the processes Z
i,j,k
t :
Zi,i,kt = 0 for k < i and Z
i,i,k
t = σφ
k−i
t for k ≥ i.
And from the drift terms, we get the system of Riccati equations: for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
for j = 0 : φ˙0t = φ
0
t · φ0t − , φ0T = c,
for j = 1 : φ˙1t = 2φ
0
t · φ1t + , φ1T = −c,
for j ≥ 2 : φ˙jt = φ0t · φjt + φ1t · φj−1t + · · ·+ φj−1t · φ1t + φjt · φ0t , φjT = 0.
(23)
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The solutions to this Riccati system coincide with the limit of the solutions to the ODE system (14) of the N-player
directed chain game in Section 2, i.e., φi· = lim
N→∞
φN,i,i+j· in the supremum norm. The Riccati system (23) is solvable.
Lemma 1. With the positive constants c > 0, ε > 0, the solution to the Riccati system (23) satisfies
∞∑
j=0
φjt = 0, φ
0
t =
(−− c√)e2
√
(T−t) + − c√
(−√− c)e2√(T−t) −√+ c > 0, (24)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Moreover, the functions φk’s are obtained by a series expansion of the generating function St(z) =∑∞
k=0 z
kφk, z ≤ 1 of the sequence {φ`} given by St(1) ≡ 0, and if z < 1,
St(z) =
(− (1− z)− c√(1− z)(1− z)) e2√(1−z)(T−t) + (1− z)− c√(1− z)(1− z)(−√(1− z)− c(1− z)) e2√(1−z)(T−t) −√(1− z) + c(1− z) (25)
for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. Given in Appendix A.1.
Remark 3. It follows from Lemma 1 that the forward dynamics (21) can be formally written as:
dXit = −
∞∑
j=0
φjtX
i+j
t dt+ σdW
i
t = φ
0
t ·
( ∞∑
j=1
−φjt
φ0t
Xi+jt −Xit
)
dt+ σdW it (26)
for i ≥ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . This is a mean-reverting type process, since φ0t > 0. We also see that this system is invariant
under the shift of indices of individuals. In particular, the law of Xi is the same as the law of X1 for every i and also
Xi is independent of (W 1, · · · ,W i−1).
We end with a summary of this section on the infinite player game.
Proposition 2. An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the infinite-player stochastic game with cost functionals (17) with
(3) is determined by (26), where {φj , j ≥ 0} are the unique solution to the infinite system (23) of Riccati equations.
4 Catalan Markov Chain
In order to simplify our analysis, we look at the stationary solution {φj , j ≥ 0} of the Riccati system (23) in Section
3, as T → ∞. Without loss of generality, we assume  = 1. By taking T → ∞, we obtain the stationary long-time
behavior satisfying φ˙j· = 0 for all j. Then, (23) gives the recurrence relation for the stationary solution {φj , j ≥ 0}:
φ0 = 1 and
n∑
j=0
φjφn−j = 0; n ≥ 0. (27)
This is closely related to the recurrence relation of Catalan numbers. By using a moment generating function method
as in Appendix A.1, we get the stationary solutions
φ0 = 1, φ1 = −1
2
, φj = − (2j − 3)!
(j − 2)! j! 22j−2 for j ≥ 2. (28)
We consider the continuous-time Markov chain M(·) with state space N? and generator matrix
Q = (qi,j) =

−1 p1 p2 p3 · · ·
0 −1 p1 p2 . . .
0 0 −1 p1 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
 , (29)
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where (i, j) element qi,j of Q is given by qi,j = pj−i ·1{j≥i} with pk = −φk, k ≥ 0, i, j ≥ 1. Note that the transition
probabilities of the continuous-time Markov chain M(·), called a Catalan Markov chain, are pi,j(t) = P(M(t) =
j|M(0) = i) = (etQ)i,j , i, j ≥ 1, t ≥ 0. Then with replacement of φjt , t ≥ 0 by the stationary solution φj in (21),
the infinite particle system (Xi· , i ≥ 1) can be represented formally as a linear stochastic evolution equation:
dXt = QXtdt+ dWt; t ≥ 0, (30)
where X. = (Xi. , i ≥ 1) with X0 = x0 and W. = (W k. , k ≥ 1). Its solution is:
Xt = e
tQx0 +
∫ t
0
e(t−s)QdWs; t ≥ 0. (31)
Without loss of generality, let us assume X0 = 0. Then,
Xit =
∫ t
0
∞∑
j=i
pi,j(t− s)dW js =
∫ t
0
∞∑
j=i
P(M(t− s) = j|M(0) = i)dW js
= EM
[ ∫ t
0
∞∑
j=i
1(M(t−s)=j)dW js |M(0) = 0
]
; t ≥ 0,
(32)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability induced by the Catalan Markov chain M(·), inde-
pendent of the Brownian motions (W j· , j ∈ N0). This is a Feynman–Kac representation formula for the infinite
particle system X· in (30) associated with the continuous-time Markov chain M(·) with the generator Q. Inter-
estingly, we may compute quite explicitly the corresponding transition probability (pi,j(·)) for the generatorQ in (29).
Proposition 3. The Gaussian process Xit , i ≥ 1 , t ≥ 0 in (30), corresponding to the Catalan Markov chain, is
Xit =
∞∑
j=i
∫ t
0
(exp(Q(t− s)))i,jdW js =
∞∑
j=i
∫ t
0
(t− s)2(j−i)
(j − i)! · F
(j−i)(−(t− s)2)dW js
=
∞∑
j=i
∫ t
0
(t− s)2(j−i)
(j − i)! · ρj−i(−(t− s)
2) e−(t−s) · dW js ,
(33)
where W j· , j ∈ N are independent standard Brownian motions and ρi(·) is defined by
ρi(x) =
1
2i
2i−1∑
j=i
(i− 1)!
(2j − 2i)!!(2i− j − 1)! · (−x)
− j2 , (34)
for i ≥ 1, and ρ0(x) = 1 for x ≤ 0.
Proof. Given in Appendix A.2.
4.1 Asymptotic Behavior of the Variances as t→∞
It follows from (33) that for t ≥ 0 , the variance of the Gaussian process Xi· , i ≥ 1, in (30) is given by
Var(Xit) = Var(X
1
t ) = Var
( ∞∑
j=1
∫ t
0
(t− s)2(j−1)
(j − 1)! F
(j−1)(−(t− s)2)dW js
)
=
∞∑
j=0
∫ t
0
(t− s)4j
(j!)2
|ρj(−(t− s)2)|2e−2(t−s)ds.
(35)
Remark 4. To evaluate the variance, we need some estimates of ρj(·) , j ∈ N in (34). It can be shown that
ρj(−ν2) = 1
2jνj
·
√
2ν
pi
· eν ·Kj−(1/2)(ν) ; j ≥ 1 , (36)
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where Kn(x) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind defined by
Kn(x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−x cosh t cosh(nt)dt ; n > −1, x > 0.
Then substituting (36) into (35), we obtain
Var(X1t ) =
∞∑
k=1
∫ t
0
2
pi
ν2k+1
(k!)2 4k
(
Kk−(1/2)(ν)
)2
dν +
1− e−2t
2
; t ≥ 0. (37)
Details are given in the Appendix A.3.
Proposition 4. As t→∞, the asymptotic variance limt→∞ Var(X1t ) is 1/
√
2.
Proof. Given in Appendix A.4.
4.2 Asymptotic Independence
With X0 = 0, it follows from Proposition 3 and Remark 4 that:
Xit =
∞∑
j=0
∫ t
0
1√
pij!
(t− s)i+1/2
2j−1/2
Kj−1/2(t− s)dWj+i(s); t ≥ 0. (38)
Then the auto-covariance and cross-covariance are given respectively by:
E[X1sX
1
t ] =
∞∑
j=0
∫ s
0
1
pi(j!)222j−1
((t− s+ u)u)j+1/2Kj−1/2(t− s+ u)Kj−1/2(u)du, 0 ≤ s ≤ t,
E[X1tX
j+1
t ] =
∞∑
`=0
1
pi(j + `)!`!
1
2j+2`−1
∫ t
0
sj+2`+1Kj+`−1/2(s)K`−1/2(s)ds, t ≥ 0.
(39)
Their asymptotic behaviors are summarized in the following. The proofs are given in Appendix A.5.
Proposition 5 (Asymptotic behavior of the auto-covariance). According to (39), the auto-covariance E[X1sX1t ] is
positive since Kn(x) > 0. Fixing s > 0, when t− s→∞, it converges to 0, i.e., the process is ergodic.
Proposition 6 (Asymptotic behavior of the cross-covariance). Similarly, for every k ≥ 0 and for any t > 0 the
cross-covariance E[X0tX
k
t ] is positive, and
0 < lim
t→∞E[X
0
tX
k
t ] =
∞∑
j=0
1
pi(k + j)!j!
1
2k+2j−1
∫ ∞
0
sk+2j+1Kk+j−1/2(s)Kj−1/2(s)ds ≤ 1√
2
.
The asymptotic cross-covariance is positive and bounded above, which means the states are asymptotically dependent
in the directed chain game.
5 Mixture of Directed Chain and Mean Field Interaction on a Finite-player System
In the spirit of the paper, we shall look at the game on a mixed system, including the directed chain interaction and
the mean field interaction for finite players. This section repeats the same steps as before to analyze the mixed system
game for N players. We assume the state dynamics of all the payers are of the form:
dXit = α
i
tdt+ σdW
i
t ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N as in the previous sections. In this model, player i chooses its own strategy αi in order to minimize its
objective function of the mixed form:
i ≤ N − 1 : J i(α1, · · · , αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
(1
2
(αit)
2 + u · 
2
(Xi+1t −Xit)2 + (1− u) ·

2
(X¯t −Xit)2
)
dt
+ u · c
2
(Xi+1T −XiT )2 + (1− u) ·
c
2
(X¯T −XiT )2
}
,
(40)
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for some positive constants , c and a weight u ∈ [0, 1]. Each player optimizes the cost determined by the mixture
of two criteria: distance from the neighbor in the directed chain with weight u and distance from the empirical mean
with weight 1− u. The notation X¯t is defined as the empirical mean, i.e., X¯t = (X1t + · · ·+XNt )/N for t ≥ 0. The
running cost function is defined by
f i(x, αi) =
1
2
(αi)2 + u · 
2
(xi+1 − xi)2 + (1− u) · 
2
(x¯− xi)2 (41)
and the terminal cost function is defined by
gi(x) = u · c
2
(xi+1 − xi)2 + (1− u) · c
2
(x¯− xi)2, (42)
where x¯ is defined by x¯ = (x1+ · · ·+xN )/N . The system is again completed by describing the behavior of playerN .
For simplicity, we consider the boundary condition of the system where XN is attracted to 0. Then we can compare
the result with that of Section 2.2.2. The cost functional for player N is given by:
JN (αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
(1
2
(αNt )
2 + u · 
2
(XNt )
2 + (1− u) · 
2
(X¯t −XNt )2
)
dt
+ u · c
2
(XNT )
2 + (1− u) · c
2
(X¯T −XNT )2
}
.
(43)
The running cost function is defined by
fN (x, αN ) =
1
2
(αN )2 + u · 
2
(xN )2 + (1− u) · 
2
(x¯− xN )2 (44)
and the terminal cost function is defined by
gN (x) = u · c
2
(xN )2 + (1− u) · c
2
(x¯− xN )2. (45)
If u = 1, the system becomes the directed chain system discussed before. If u = 0, it becomes a mean-field system
where each player is attracted towards the mean of the system.
5.1 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
We search for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the system among strategies {αit, i = 1, · · · , N}. The Hamiltonian
Hi for player i is given by:
Hi(x1, · · · , xN , yi,1, · · · , yi,N , α1, · · · , αN ) =
N∑
k=1
αkyi,k +
1
2
(αi)2 + u

2
(xi+1 − xi)2 + (1− u) 
2
(x¯− xi)2,
and the Hamiltonian HN for player N is given by:
HN (x1, · · · , xN , yi,1, · · · , yi,N , α1, · · · , αN ) =
N∑
k=1
αkyi,k +
1
2
(αi)2 + u

2
(xN )2 + (1− u) 
2
(x¯− xi)2.
The value of αi minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to αi is given by:
∂αiH
i = yi,i + αi = 0 leading to the choice: αˆi = −yi,i.
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The adjoint processes Y it = (Y
i,j
t ; j = 1, · · · , N) and Zit = (Zi,j,kt ; j = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · , N) for i = 1, · · · , N
are defined as the solutions of the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs):
i < N :

dY i,jt = −∂xjHi(Xt, Y it , αt)dt+
N∑
k=0
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t
= −
[
u(Xi+1t −Xit)(δi+1,j − δi,j) + (1− u)(X¯t −Xit)
( 1
N
− δi,j
)]
dt+
N∑
k=0
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t ,
Y i,jT = ∂xjgi(XT ) = uc(X
i+1
T −XiT )(δi+1,j − δi,j) + (1− u)c(X¯T −XiT )( 1N − δi,j).
i = N :

dY N,jt = −
[
uXNt δN,j + (1− u)(X¯t −XNt )
( 1
N
− δN,j
)]
dt+
N∑
k=0
ZN,j,kt dW
k
t ,
Y N,jT = ucX
N
T δN,j + (1− u)c(X¯T −XNT )
( 1
N
− δN,j
)
.
(46)
When j = i, it becomes:
dY i,it =
[
u(Xi+1t −Xit) + (1− u)(X¯t −Xit)(1−
1
N
)
]
dt+
N∑
k=0
Zi,i,kt dW
k
t ,
Y i,iT = −uc(Xi+1T −XiT )− (1− u)c(X¯T −XiT )
(
1− 1
N
)
, i < N
dY N,Nt =
[
− uXNt + (1− u)(X¯t −XNt )
(
1− 1
N
)]
dt+
N∑
k=0
ZN,N,kt dW
k
t ,
Y N,NT = ucX
N
T − (1− u)c(X¯T −XNT )
(
1− 1
N
)
.
(47)
Considering the BSDE system and the initial condition, we then make the following ansatz with function parameters
depending on N :
Y i,it = u
N∑
j=i
φN,i,jt X
j
t − (1− u)(X¯t −Xit)θNt , (48)
for some deterministic scalar functions φt, θt satisfying the terminal condition: when i < N , φ
N,i,i
T = c, φ
N,i,i+1
T =
−c, φN,i,jT = 0 for N ≥ j ≥ i+ 2; φN,N,NT = c and θNT = c(1− 1N ). For simplicity of notation, we denote θt = θNt .
Using the ansatz (48), the optimal strategy and forward equation become:
αˆi = −Y i,it = −u
N∑
j=i
φN,i,jt X
j
t + (1− u)(X¯t −Xit)θt,
dXjt =
[
− u
N∑
k=j
φN,j,kt X
k
t + (1− u)(X¯t −Xjt )θt
]
dt+ σdW jt .
By taking the average, we obtain
dX¯t = −u · 1
N
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=j
φN,j,kt X
k
t dt+ σ ·
1
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt = −u ·
1
N
N∑
k=1
(
k∑
j=1
φN,j,kt )X
k
t dt+ σ ·
1
N
N∑
k=1
dW kt
and then
d(X¯t −Xit) = −u ·
1
N
i−1∑
k=1
(
k∑
j=1
φN,j,kt )X
k
t dt+ u
N∑
k=i+1
(
φN,i,kt −
1
N
k∑
j=1
φN,j,kt
)
Xkt dt
+
(
uφN,i,it − u
1
N
i∑
j=1
φN,j,it + (1− u)θt
)
Xitdt− (1− u)X¯tθtdt
+ σ
( 1
N
N∑
k=1
dW kt − udW it
)
.
(49)
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Differentiating the ansatz (48) and using (49), we obtain
dY i,it = u ·
N∑
j=i
[Xjt φ˙
N,i,j
t dt+ φ
N,i,j
t dX
j
t ]− (1− u) ·
(
θ˙t(X¯t −Xit)dt+ θtd(X¯t −Xit)
)
def
= u · I − (1− u) · II.
(50)
For the first term, we have
I =
N∑
j=i
[Xjt φ˙
N,i,j
t dt+ φ
N,i,j
t dX
j
t ]
=
N∑
k=i
(
φ˙N,i,kt − u
k∑
j=i
φN,i,jt φ
N,j,k
t − (1− u)θtφN,i,kt
)
Xkt dt+ (1− u)θt
N∑
k=i
φN,i,kt · X¯tdt+ σ
N∑
k=i
φN,i,kt dW
k
t .
Then, for the second term, we have
II = θ˙t(X¯t −Xit)dt+ θtd(X¯t −Xit)
= −uθt 1
N
i−1∑
k=1
(
k∑
j=1
φN,j,kt )X
k
t dt+ uθt
N∑
k=i+1
(φN,i,kt −
1
N
k∑
j=1
φN,j,kt )X
k
t dt
− [θ˙t − uθt(φN,i,it −
1
N
i∑
j=1
φN,j,it )− (1− u)θ2t ]Xitdt
+ (θ˙t − (1− u)θ2t )X¯tdt+ σ(
1
N
N∑
k=1
dW kt − dW it ).
(51)
Thus dY i,it = u · I − (1− u) · II in (50) can be written as:
i−1∑
k=1
(u(1− u)θt 1
N
k∑
j=1
φN,j,kt )X
k
t dt
+
N∑
k=i+1
[uφ˙N,i,kt − u2
k∑
j=i
φN,i,jt φ
N,j,k
t − u(1− u)θtφN,i,kt − u(1− u)θt(φN,i,kt −
1
N
k∑
j=1
φN,j,kt )]X
k
t dt
+ [uφ˙N,i,it − u2(φN,i,it )2 − 2u(1− u)θtφN,i,it + (1− u)θ˙t + u(1− u)θt
1
N
i∑
j=1
φN,j,it − (1− u)2θ2t ]Xitdt
+ [u(1− u)θt
N∑
k=i
φN,i,kt − (1− u)θ˙t + (1− u)2θ2t ]X¯tdt
+ uσ
N∑
k=i
φN,i,kt dW
k
t − (1− u)σθt(
1
N
N∑
k=1
dW kt − dW it )
(52)
Now we compare the two Itoˆ’s decompositions (47) and (52). The martingale terms give the processes Zi,j,kt :
Zi,i,kt = −(1− u)σθt 1N for k < i,
Zi,i,it = uσφ
N,i,i
t + (1− u)σθt(1− 1N ) and Zi,i,kt = uσφN,i,kt for k > i.
And from the drift terms, we get the following system of ordinary differential equations:
when i < N ,
for i : uφ˙N,i,it − u2(φN,i,it )2 − 2u(1− u)θtφN,i,it + (1− u)θ˙t
(
1− 1
N
)
− (1− u)2θ2t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ u(1− u)θt 1
N
( i∑
j=1
φN,j,it +
N∑
k=i
φN,i,kt
)
= −u− (1− u)
(
1− 1
N
)2
, φN,i,iT = c,
(53)
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for i+ 1 : uφ˙N,i,i+1t − u2(φN,i,it φN,i,i+1t + φN,i,i+1t φN,i+1,i+1t )
− 2u(1− u)θtφN,i,i+1t − (1− u)θ˙t
1
N
+ (1− u)2θ2t
1
N
+ u(1− u)θt 1
N
( i+1∑
j=1
φN,j,i+1t +
N∑
k=i
φN,i,kt
)
= u+ (1− u)
(
1− 1
N
) 1
N
, φN,i,i+1T = −c,
for ` ≥ i+ 2 : uφ˙N,i,`t − u2
l∑
j=i
φN,i,jt φ
N,j,`
t − 2u(1− u)θtφN,i,`t − (1− u)θ˙t
1
N
+ (1− u)2θ2t
1
N
+ u(1− u)θt 1
N
(
l∑
j=1
φN,j,`t +
N∑
k=i
φN,i,kt ) = (1− u)
(
1− 1
N
) 1
N
, φN,i,`T = 0,
and u(1− u)θt
N∑
k=i
φN,i,kt − (1− u)θ˙t + (1− u)2θ2t = (1− u)
(
1− 1
N
)
, θT = c
(
1− 1
N
)
;
When i = N ,
uφ˙N,N,Nt − u2(φN,N,Nt )2 − 2u(1− u)θtφN,N,Nt + (1− u)θ˙t
(
1− 1
N
)
− (1− u)2θ2t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ u(1− u)θt 1
N
(
N∑
j=1
φN,j,Nt + φ
N,N,N
t ) = −u− (1− u)
(
1− 1
N
)2
, φN,i,iT = c,
and u(1− u)θtφN,N,Nt − (1− u)θ˙t + (1− u)2θ2t = (1− u)
(
1− 1
N
)
, θT = c
(
1− 1
N
)
;
(54)
When u = 1, the systems (53) and (54) are exactly what we obtained for finite-player directed chain game in section 2.
We have the similar conclusion that the boundary condition does not affect the functions φN,i,jt (j < N) for all i < N .
We can also compare the system (53) with the system (65) - (68) we introduce later. Under suitable assumptions, the
system (53) may converge, as the number N of players goes to infinity.
6 Infinite-Player Game Model with Mean-Field Interaction
Motivated by Section 5 and following Section 3, we can define a game with infinite players on a mixed system,
including the directed chain interaction and the mean field interaction. This section searches for an open-loop Nash
equilibrium and repeats the same steps as before to analyse the infinite mixed system game. We have a more general
Catalan Markov chain and Table 1 below shows the asymptotic behaviors of the variances and covariances as t→∞
for the process with different types of interactions. Comparing it with Table 1 in Detering, Fouque & Ichiba [3], we
have similar conclusions except that our asymptotic variance of purely directed chain does not explode.
The game model is given by:
dXit = α
i
tdt+ σdW
i
t ; i = 1, 2, · · · , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (55)
where (W it )0≤t≤T , i ∈ N are independent standard Brownian motions. We assume the same drift and diffusion
coefficients and the initial conditions as the finite-player game. By choosing αit, player i tries to minimize:
J i(α1, α2, · · · ) = E
{∫ T
0
(1
2
(αit)
2 + u · 
2
(Xi+1t −Xit)2 + (1− u) ·

2
(mt −Xit)2
)
dt
+ u · c
2
(Xi+1T −XiT )2 + (1− u) ·
c
2
(mT −XiT )2
}
,
for some positive constants , c and u ∈ [0, 1]. Here, there is an issue in the choice of mt. Intuitively, it should come
from the finite-player mixed game described in Section 5 as the limit of X¯· as N → ∞. Combined with the fact that
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we had E{Xit} independent of i, it is natural to set mt = E{Xit} and check afterwards that this mean value does not
depend on i de facto after solving the fixed point step. Note that the case u = 0 is very particular, and consists in
solving the same mean field game problem for every i. The case u = 1 has already been studied in Section 3, and
therefore, in what follows, we concentrate on the case u ∈ (0, 1).
6.1 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
We search for Nash equilibria of the system among strategies {αit, i = 1, 2, · · · }. The Hamiltonian for individual i is
given by:
Hi(t, x1, x2, · · · , yi,1, yi,2, · · · , α1, α2, · · · ) =
∞∑
k=1
αkyi,k+
1
2
(αi)2 +u

2
(xi+1−xi)2 +(1−u) 
2
(mt−xi)2. (56)
The adjoint processes Y it = (Y
i,j
t ; j ≥ 1) and Zit = (Zi,j,kt ; j ≥ 1, k ≥ 1) for i = 1, 2, · · · are defined as the solutions
of the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs): dY
i,j
t = −
{
u(Xi+1t −Xit)(δi+1,j − δi,j) + (1− u)(mt −Xit)(−δi,j)
}
dt+
∞∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t ,
Y i,jT = ∂xjgi(XT ) = uc(X
i+1
T −XiT )(δi+1,j − δi,j) + (1− u)c(mT −XiT )(−δi,j).
(57)
When j = i, it becomes: dY
i,i
t =
{
u(Xi+1t −Xit) + (1− u)(mt −Xit)
}
dt+
∞∑
k=1
Zi,i,kt dW
k
t ,
Y i,iT = −uc(Xi+1T −XiT )− (1− u)c(mT −XiT ).
(58)
According to the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle, by minimizing the Hamiltonian Hi with respect to αi, we
can get the optimal strategy: αˆi = −yi,i. Then the forward equation becomes:
dXit = −Y i,it dt+ σdW it . (59)
Similar as Carmona, Fouque, and Sun [1], we define mXt = E(Xt) and m
Y
t = E(Yt). In equilibrium, we have:
mXt = mt for t ≤ T .
Taking expectation in (58), we have: dmYt = 0 and m
Y
T = 0, and hence, m
Y
t = 0 for t ≤ T .
Taking expectation in (59) we get: dmXt = −mYt dt = 0 and mX0 = E(ξ) = 0, and hence, mXt = 0 for t ≤ T .
Now we make the ansatz:
Y i,it = u
∞∑
j=i
φj−it X
j
t − (1− u)(mt −Xit)ψt, (60)
for some deterministic scalar functions φt, ψt satisfying the terminal condition φ0T = c, φ
1
T = −c, φkT = 0 for k ≥ 2
and ψT = c. Using this ansatz, the forward equation (55) becomes
αˆi = −Y i,it = −u
∞∑
j=i
φj−it X
j
t + (1− u)(mt −Xit)ψt,
dXit =
(− u ∞∑
j=i
φj−it X
j
t + (1− u)(mt −Xit)ψt
)
dt+ σdW it .
(61)
Using (61) and dmt = dmXt = 0, we can differentiate the ansatz (60) to obtain
dY i,it = u ·
∞∑
j=i
[Xjt φ˙
j−i
t dt+ φ
j−i
t dX
j
t ]− (1− u) ·
(
ψ˙t(mt −Xit)dt+ ψtd(mt −Xit)
)
def
= u · I − (1− u) · II
(62)
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where
I =
∞∑
j=i
[Xjt φ˙
j−i
t dt+ φ
j−i
t dX
j
t ]
=
∞∑
k=0
(
φ˙kt − u
k∑
j=0
φjtφ
k−j
t
)
Xi+kt dt+ (1− u)ψt
∞∑
k=0
φkt (mt −Xi+kt )dt+ σ
∞∑
k=i
φk−it dW
k
t
(63)
and
II = ψ˙t(mt −Xit)dt+ ψtd(mt −Xit) = uψt
∞∑
k=0
φktX
i+k
t dt+ (ψ˙t − (1− u)ψ2t )(mt −Xit)dt− ψtσdW it . (64)
Now we compare the two Itoˆ’s decompositions (62) and (58). First, the martingale terms give the processes Zi,j,kt :
Zi,i,kt = 0 for k < i, Z
i,i,i
t = uσφ
0
t + (1− u)σψt and Zi,i,kt = uσφk−it for k > i.
And from the drift terms we obtain the system of ordinary differential equations:
for k = 0 : uφ˙0t − u2(φ0t )2 − 2u(1− u)ψtφ0t + (1− u)ψ˙t − (1− u)2ψ2t = −, ψT = c, φ0T = c (65)
for k = 1 : uφ˙1t − 2u2φ0tφ1t − 2u(1− u)ψtφ1t = u, φ1T = −c (66)
for k ≥ 2 : uφ˙kt − u2
k∑
j=0
φjtφ
k−j
t − 2u(1− u)ψtφkt = 0, φkT = 0 (67)
and u(1− u)ψt
∞∑
k=0
φkt − (1− u)ψ˙t + (1− u)2ψ2t = (1− u), ψT = c. (68)
In Appendix A.6 we show the following result which simplifies (68) considerably.
Proposition 7. The solution φj· to the system of Riccati equations satisfies
∑∞
j=0 φ
j
t = 0 for t ≥ 0.
Using Proposition 7 and 0 < u < 1, we can simplify the equations (65) to (68):
ψ˙t = (1− u)ψ2t − , ψT = c (Riccati),
for k = 0 : φ˙0t = uφ
0
t · φ0t + 2(1− u)ψtφ0t − , φ0T = c (Riccati),
for k = 1 : φ˙1t = 2uφ
0
t · φ1t + 2(1− u)ψtφ1t + , φ1T = −c,
for k ≥ 2 : φ˙kt = u(φ0t · φkt + φ1t · φk−1t + · · ·+ φk−1t · φ1t + φkt · φ0t ) + 2(1− u)ψtφkt , φkT = 0.
(69)
Looking at the stationary solution (in the limit (T → ∞), and without loss of generality assuming  = 1 again, the
recurrence relation can be solved by the method of moment generating function to obtain:
ψ =
√
1
1−u , φ
0 = 1−
√
1−u
u ,
φ1 = − 12 , φk = −
(2k − 3)!
(k − 2)!k!22k−2u
k−1, for k ≥ 2.
(70)
6.2 Catalan Markov Chain for the Mixed Model
As in Section 4, we consider a continuous-time Markov chain M (u)(·) in the state space N with generator matrix
Q(u) =

−1 q1 q2 q3 · · ·
0 −1 q1 q2 . . .
0 0 −1 q1 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
 (71)
where qk = −uφk > 0 with φk in (70) for k ≥ 1. Note that
∑∞
k=1 qk = 1−
√
1− u.
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For 0 < u < 1, Q(u) is the generator of the Markov chain from i to i + k with rate qk and killed with probability√
1− u. The infinite particle system (61) can be represented as the infinite-dimensional stochastic evolution equation:
dX
(u)
t = Q
(u)X
(u)
t dt+ dWt, (72)
where X(u). = (X
i
. , i ∈ N) with X(u)0 = x(u)0 and W. = (W i. , i ∈ N). The solution is formally written by
X
(u)
t = e
tQ(u)x
(u)
0 +
∫ t
0
e(t−s)Q
(u)
dWs; t ≥ 0. (73)
Note that the transition probabilities of the continuous-time Markov chain M (u)(·) is : pi,j(t) = P(M (u)(t) =
j|M (u)(0) = i) = (etQ(u))i,j , i, j ≥ 1 , t ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, assume x(u)0 = 0. Then,
Xit =
∫ t
0
∞∑
j=i
pi,j(t− s)dW js =
∫ t
0
∞∑
j=i
P(M(t− s) = j|M(0) = i)dW js
= EM
[ ∫ t
0
∞∑
j=i
1(M(t−s)=j)dW js |M(0) = i
]
; t ≥ 0,
(74)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability induced by the Markov chain M (u)(·), independent of
the Brownian motions (W k· , k ∈ N). Therefore, we have a Feynman–Kac representation formula for the generator
Q(u). Since
k−1∑
i=1
qiqk−i = u2
k−1∑
i=1
φ
(i)
t φ
(k−i)
t = −2uφ(k)t = 2qk we have (Q(u))2 = I − uB with B having 1 ’s on
the upper second diagonal and 0 ’s elsewhere, i.e.,
(Q(u))2 = I − uB =

1 −u 0 · · ·
0 1 −u . . .
. . . . . . . . .
 . (75)
With a smooth function F (x) := exp(−√−x) , x ∈ C, the matrix exponential of Q(u)t can be written formally
exp(Q(u)t) = F ((−I + uB)t2) =
∞∑
j=0
F (j)(−t2)
j!
(uBt2)j =
∞∑
j=0
ujt2jF (j)(−t2)
j!
Bj
for t ≥ 0. Then the (i, j) -element of exp(Qt) is formally given by
(exp(Q(u)t))i,j =
uj−it2(j−i) · F (j−i)(−t2)
(j − i)! , i ≤ j , where F
(j)(x) :=
djF
dxj
(x) ; x > 0 , j ∈ N ,
and (exp(Q(u)t))i,j = 0 , i > j for t ≥ 0 .
As in Section 4, we have the same solution for F (k)(x) : F (k)(x) = ρk(x)e−
√−x , where ρk(·) was defined in (34),
and we can summarize our finding:
Proposition 8. The Gaussian process Xit , i ∈ N , t ≥ 0 , corresponding to the (Catalan) general Markov chain, is
Xit =
∞∑
j=0
∫ t
0
(exp(Q(u)(t− s)))i,jdW js =
∞∑
j=i
∫ t
0
uj−i(t− s)2(j−i)
(j − i)! · F
(j−i)(−(t− s)2)dW js
=
∞∑
j=i
∫ t
0
uj−i(t− s)2(j−i)
(j − i)! · ρj−i(−(t− s)
2) e−(t−s) · dW js , (76)
where W j· , j ∈ N are independent standard Brownian motions.
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6.3 Asymptotic Behavior
Table 1 exhibits the asymptotic behaviors of their variances and covariances as t → ∞. The calculation is given in
Appendix A.7. We find that only when u = 0 (i.e. pure mean field game), the asymptotic cross-covariance is zero,
which means the states are asymptotically independent. Otherwise, they are dependent and their covariance is finite.
Note that in the purely nearest neighbor interaction studied in Detering, Fouque, and Ichiba [3], i.e., in the case u = 0,
the variance is not stabilized as in our “Catalan” interaction equilibrium dynamics.
u Interaction Type Asymptotic Variance Asymptotic Independence between two players
u = 0 Purely mean-field Stabilized Independent
u ∈ (0, 1) Mixed interaction Stabilized Dependent
u = 1 Purely directed chain Stabilized Dependent
Table 1: Asymptotic behaviors as t→∞
7 Periodic Directed Chain Game
We consider a stochastic game with finite players on a periodic ring structure. We assume the dynamics of the states
of the individual players are given by N stochastic differential equations of the form:
dXit = α
i
tdt+ σdW
i
t , i = 1, · · · , N, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (77)
where (W it )0≤t≤T , i = 1, · · · , N are one-dimensional independent standard Brownian motions. The drift coefficient
function, the diffusion coefficient and the initial conditions are assumed to be the same as those in Section 2. In this
model, player i chooses its own strategy αi in order to minimize its objective function of the form:
J i(α1, · · · , αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
(
1
2
(αit)
2 +

2
(Xi+1t −Xit)2
)
dt+
c
2
(Xi+1T −XiT )2
}
, (78)
for constants  > 0, and c ≥ 0, and we define XN+1· = X1· .
7.1 Construction of an Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
We search for Nash equilibria of the system among strategies {αit, i = 1, · · · , N}. We construct an open-loop Nash
equilibrium by the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle. The Hamiltonian for player i is given by:
Hi(x1, · · · , xN , yi,1, · · · , yi,N , α1, · · · , αN ) =
N∑
k=1
αkyi,k +
1
2
(αi)2 +

2
(xi+1 − xi)2. (79)
The adjoint processes Y it = (Y
i,j
t ; j = 1, · · · , N) and Zit = (Zi,j,kt ; j, k = 1, · · · , N) for i = 1, · · · , N are defined
as the solutions of the system of the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs): dY i,jt = −(Xi+1t −Xit)(δi+1,j − δi,j)dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t ,
Y i,jT = ∂xjgi(XT ) = c(X
i+1
T −XiT )(δi+1,j − δi,j).
(80)
Based on the sufficiency part of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle, we can get an open-loop Nash equilib-
rium by minimizing the Hamiltonian Hi with respect to αi:
∂αiH
i = yi,i + αi = 0 leading to the choice: αˆi = −yi,i. (81)
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With this choice for the controls αi’s, the forward equation (77) becomes coupled with the backward equation (80).
We make the ansatz:
Y i,it =
N−1∑
j=0
φN,jt X
i+j
t , (82)
for some deterministic scalar functions φt satisfying the terminal conditions: φ
N,0
T = c, φ
N,1
T = −c, φN,kT = 0 for
k ≥ 2 andXi+jt def= X(i+j) mod Nt . Using the ansatz, the optimal strategy (81) and the forward equation (77) become:
αˆi = −Y i,it = −
N−1∑
j=0
φN,jt X
i+j
t , dX
i
t = −
N−1∑
j=0
φN,jt X
i+j
t dt+ σdW
i
t . (83)
Using the equations (83), we can differentiate the ansatz (82):
dY i,it =
N−1∑
j=0
[Xi+jt φ˙
N,j
t dt+ φ
N,j
t dX
i+j
t ]
=
∑
j = 0N−1Xi+jt φ˙
N,j
t dt−
N−1∑
j=0
φN,jt
N−1∑
k=0
φN,kt X
i+j+k
t dt+
N−1∑
j=0
σφN,jt dW
i+j
t
(84)
Now we compare the two Itoˆ’s decompositions (84) and (80) of Y i,it . The martingale terms give the processes Z
i,j,k
t :
Zi,i,kt = σφ
N,N+k−i
t for 1 ≤ k < i and Zi,i,kt = σφN,k−it for i ≤ k ≤ N.
And from the drift terms, we get the system of ordinary differential equations
for k = 0 : φ˙N,0t = φ
N,0
t · φN,0t +
N−1∑
i=1
φN,it φ
N,N−i
t − , φN,0T = c,
for k = 1 : φ˙N,1t = φ
N,0
t · φN,1t + φN,1t · φN,0t +
N−1∑
i=2
φN,it φ
N,N+1−i
t + , φ
N,1
T = −c,
for N − 1 > k ≥ 2 : φ˙N,kt =
k∑
j=0
φN,jt φ
N,k−j
t +
N−1∑
i=k+1
φN,it φ
N,N+k−i
t , φ
N,k
T = 0,
for k = N − 1 : φ˙N,N−1t =
N−1∑
j=0
φN,jt φ
N,N−1−j
t , φ
N,N−1
T = 0.
(85)
It can be written as a matrix Ricatti equation:
Φ˙N (t) = ΦN (t)ΦN (t)−E , ΦN (T ) := C , (86)
where ΦN (·) is the N ×N matrix-valued function given by
ΦN (t) :=

φN,0t φ
N,N−1
t · · · φN,1t
φN,1t φ
N,0
t
. . . φN,2t
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . φN,N−1t
φN,N−1t · · · φN,1t φN,0t

,
and E and C are constant matrices defined by
E :=

 0 · · · 0 −
−  . . . . . . 0
0 − . . . . . . ...
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 − 

, C :=

c 0 · · · 0 −c
−c c . . . . . . 0
0 −c . . . . . . ...
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 −c c

.
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Proposition 9. The solution φN,k· , k = 1, . . . , N to the system of Riccati equations (85) satisfies the relation∑N−1
k=0 φ
N,k
t = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. Given in Appendix A.8.
With finiteN , these equations are not easy to solve explicitely. If we takeN =∞, we expect that the system converges
to the Riccati system of the infinite-player game studied in Section 3.
Conjecture 1. The limit of each element in ΦN (·) in (86) exists asN →∞, i.e., ΦN (t)→ Φ∞(t) and the limit Φ∞(t)
is an infinite dimensional, lower triangular, matrix-valued function of t ≥ 0 given by Φ∞(t) = (Φ∞,i,j(t))i,j∈N with
Φ∞,i,j(·) ≡ 0 if i < j; Φ∞,i,j(·) ≡ φi−j if i ≥ j, where the functions φk’s are given by the system of ordinary
differential equations (23).
Remark 5. Proving this conjecture is equivalent to show that
∑N−1
k=j+1 φ
N,k
t φ
N,N+j−k
t → 0 asN →∞. For instance,
for j = 0, one needs to show that
∑N−1
k=1 φ
N,k
t φ
N,N−k
t → 0. As of now, this remains an open problem.
Our conjecture is substantiated by numerical evidences presented below.
7.2 Numerical Results
Using the methods given in [6], we can get the numerical solution of the matrix Riccati equation (86). Taking  =
2, c = 1, T = 10 (large terminal time), Figure 3 (a)-(b) show the behaviors of the φ functions defined by the system of
differential equations (23) forN = 4 andN = 100. They converge to the constant solutions of the infinite game given
in Section 4, except in the tail close to maturity as T is large but not infinite. This result confirms our conjecture stated
in the previous section. Figure 3 (c) shows the behavior of the function
∑N−1
k=1 φ
N,k
t φ
N,N−k
t for different values of N .
As we can see, the sum converges to 0 when N becomes larger, which supports the statement in Remark 5. Though
these numerical results give us strong evidence and confidence that the conjecture is true, a mathematical proof is still
needed and it is part of our ongoing research.
(a) N=4 (b) N=100 (c)
N−1∑
k=1
φN,kt φ
N,N−k
t
Figure 3: As N increases, the blue line φN,0t → 1, the orange line φN,1t → − 12 , and φN,kt → 0 for ≥ 2 in (a)-(b).
N−1∑
k=1
φN,kt φ
N,N−k
t for different values of N in (c).
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Root (1, 1)
(2, 1)
(3, 1) (4, 1)
...
...
(3, d) ...
(2, 2)
(3, d+ 1) ...
...
...
(3, 2d) ...
...
...
... · · · · · ·
Infinite
generations
(2, d)
(3, d(d− 1) + 1) ...
...
...
(3, d2) (4, d3)
Figure 4: Directed Tree Network
8 Directed Infinite Tree Game
We describe a stochastic game on a directed tree structure withN ≥ 2 generations first. Starting with one player in the
root node denoted by (1, 1) in the first generation, recursively each parent has a fixed, common number of descendants,
denoted by d ≥ 1, and there are dn−1 players in the n-th generation for n ≥ 1. For 1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ dn−1,
Xn,k represents the state of the k-th individual of the n-th generation, and its direct descendants in the (n + 1)st
generation are labelled as {Xn+1,(k−1)d+1, Xn+1,(k−1)d+2, · · · , Xn+1,kd}. We consider the stochastic differential
game of players in the N generations and then we generalize to a stochastic differential game in a directed infinite tree
by considering its limit as N →∞. The network is shown in Figure 4.
We assume the dynamics of the states of the players are given by the stochastic differential equations of the form:
dXn,kt = α
n,k
t dt+ σdW
n,k
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (87)
where (Wn,kt )0≤t≤T , 1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ dn−1 are one-dimensional independent standard Brownian motions.
Similarly, we assume that the diffusion is one-dimensional and the diffusion coefficients are constant and identical
denoted by σ > 0. The drift coefficients αn,k’s are adapted to the filtration of the Brownian motions and satisfy
E[
∫ T
0
|αn,kt |2dt] < ∞. The system starts at time t = 0 from i.i.d. square-integrable random variables Xn,k0 = ξn,k
independent of the Brownian motions and, without loss of generality, we assume E(ξn,k) = 0 for every pair of (n, k).
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In this model, among the firstN−1 generations, each player (n, k) chooses its own strategy αn,k in order to minimize
its objective function of the form: for 1 ≤ n < N
Jn,k(αm,l; 1 ≤ m ≤ N, 1 ≤ l ≤ dm)
= E
{∫ T
0
(1
2
(αn,kt )
2 +

2
(1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
Xn+1,it −Xn,kt
)2)
dt+
c
2
(1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
Xn+1,iT −Xn,kT
)2}
,
(88)
for some constants  > 0 and c ≥ 0. The running cost and the terminal cost functions are defined by fn,k(x, αn,k) =
1
2 (α
n,k)2 + 2 (
1
d
∑kd
i=(k−1)d+1 x
n+1,i − xn,k)2 and gn,k(x) = c2 ( 1d
∑kd
i=(k−1)d+1 x
n+1,i − xn,k)2, respectively. For
simplicity, the behaviours of the N -th generation are described by the boundary condition where all the players
{XN,k, 1 ≤ k ≤ dN−1} are attracted to 0. The cost functional for player (N, k) is given by:
JN,k(αN,k) = E
{∫ T
0
(1
2
(αN,kt )
2 +

2
(XN,kt )
2
)
dt+
c
2
(XN,kT )
2
}
for k = 1, . . . , dN−1. Since players of the last generation do not depend on the other players, the boundary condition
defines a self-controlled problem for the last generation.
Now, inspired by the conclusion in Section 2, as the number N of generations goes to infinity, i.e., N →∞, the effect
of the boundary condition should vanish. Thus it is natural and reasonable that we decide to pass the N -generation
finite tree to an infinite tree with infinite number of generations, and study the Nash equilibrium of the infinite-tree
game. We still assume each parent has d descendants. The dynamics of the states of players and the cost functions are
the same as (87) and (88) with n ≥ 1.
8.1 Open-Loop Nash Equilibria
We search for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the directed infinite-tree system among strategies {αn,k;n ≥ 1, 1 ≤
k ≤ dn−1}. The Hamiltonian for player (n, k) is of the form:
Hn,k(xm,l, yn,k;m,l, αm,l;m ∈ N, 1 ≤ l ≤ dm−1)
=
Mn∑
m=1
dm−1∑
l=1
αm,lyn,k;m,l +
1
2
(αn,k)2 +

2
(1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
xn+1,i − xn,k
)2
,
assuming it is defined on Y n,kt ’s where only finitely many Y
n,k;m,l
t ’s are non-zero for every given (n, k). Here, Mn
represents a depth of this finite dependence, a finite number depending on n with Mn > n for n ≥ 1. This assumption
is checked in Remark 6 below. Thus, the Hamiltonian Hn,k for player (n, k) is well defined for n ≥ 1.
The adjoint processes Y n,kt = (Y
n,k;m,l
t ;m ∈ N, 1 ≤ l ≤ dm−1) and Zn,kt = (Zn,k;m,l;p,qt ;m, p ∈ N, 1 ≤ l ≤
dm−1, 1 ≤ q ≤ dp−1) for n ∈ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ dn−1 are defined as the solutions of the backward stochastic differential
equations (BSDEs):
dY n,k;m,lt = −∂xm,lHn,k(Xt, Y n,kt , αt)dt+
∞∑
p=1
dp−1∑
q=1
Zn,k;m,l;p,qt dW
p,q
t
= −
[(1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
Xn+1,it −Xn,kt
)(1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
δ(n+1,i),(m,l) − δ(n,k),(m,l)
)]
dt
+
∞∑
p=1
dp−1∑
q=1
Zn,k;m,l;p,qt dW
p,q
t ,
Y n,k;m,lT = ∂xm,lgn,k(XT )
= c ·
(1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
Xn+1,iT −Xn,kT
)(1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
δ(n+1,i),(m,l) − δ(n,k),(m,l)
)
.
(89)
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Remark 6. For every (m, l) 6= (n, k) or (n + 1, i) where (k − 1)d + 1 ≤ i ≤ kd, dY n,k;m,lt =∑∞
p=1
∑dp−1
q=1 Z
n,k;m,l;p,q
t dW
p,q
t and Y
n,k;m,l
T = 0 implies Z
n,k;m,l;p,q
t = 0 for all (p, q). Thus, there must be finitely
many non-zero Y n,k;m,l’s for every (n, k). Hence, the Hamiltonian can be rewritten as
Hn,k(xm,l, yn,k;n,k, yn,k;n+1,i, αm,l;m ∈ N, 1 ≤ l ≤ dm−1, (k − 1)d+ 1 ≤ i ≤ kd)
= αn,kyn,k;n,k +
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
αn+1,iyn,k;n+1,i +
1
2
(
αn,k)2 +

2
(
1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
xn+1,i − xn,k
)2
.
When (m, l) = (n, k), (89) becomes:
dY n,k;n,kt = 
(1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
Xn+1,it −Xn,kt
)
dt+
∞∑
p=1
dp−1∑
q=1
Zn,k;n,k;p,qt dW
p,q
t ,
Y n,k;n,kT = −c
(1
d
kd∑
i=(k−1)d+1
Xn+1,iT −Xn,kT
)
.
(90)
By minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to αn,k, we can get an open-loop Nash equilibrium: αˆn,k = −yn,k;n,k
for all (n, k). Considering the BSDE system, we make the ansatz of the form:
Y n,k;n,kt =
∞∑
i=0
φit
di−1∑
j=0
Xn+i,d
ik−j
t =
∞∑
m=n
φm−nt
dm−n−1∑
j=0
Xm,d
m−nk−j
t , (91)
for some deterministic scalar function φt satisfying the terminal conditions: φ0T = c, φ
1
T = − cd , φkT = 0 for k ≥ 2.
Using the ansatz, the optimal strategy αˆn,k and the forward equation for Xn,k· in (87) become:
αˆn,kt = −Y n,k;n,kt = −
∞∑
m=n
φm−nt
dm−n−1∑
j=0
Xm,d
m−nk−j
t ,
dXn,kt = −
∞∑
m=n
φm−nt
dm−n−1∑
j=0
Xm,d
m−nk−j
t dt+ σdW
n,k
t ,
(92)
which gives: for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
dXr,d
r−nk−s
t = −
∞∑
p=r
φp−rt
dp−r−1∑
j=0
Xp,d
p−nk−dp−rs−j
t dt+ σdW
r,dr−nk−s
t .
Differentiating the ansatz (91) and substituting (92), we obtain:
dY n,k;n,kt =
∞∑
r=n
φ˙r−nt
dr−n−1∑
s=0
Xr,d
r−nk−s
t dt+
∞∑
r=n
φr−nt
dr−n−1∑
s=0
dXr,d
r−nk−s
t
def
= I dt− II dt+ σ
∞∑
r=n
φr−nt
dr−n−1∑
s=0
dW r,d
r−nk−s
t ,
(93)
where the drift term consists of two terms. First,
I =
∞∑
r=n
φ˙r−nt
dr−n−1∑
s=0
Xr,d
r−nk−s
t =
∞∑
r=0
φ˙rt
dr−1∑
s=0
Xn+r,d
rk−s
t ,
and then, the second term is
II =
∞∑
r=n
φr−nt
dr−n−1∑
s=0
∞∑
p=r
φp−rt
dp−r−1∑
j=0
Xp,d
p−nk−dp−rs−j
t =
∞∑
r=0
r∑
i=0
φitφ
r−i
t
di−1∑
s=0
dr−i−1∑
j=0
Xn+r,d
rk−dr−is−j
t .
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for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Thus, (93) can be rewritten as:
dY n,k;n,kt = I dt− II dt+ σ
∞∑
r=n
φr−nt
dr−n−1∑
s=0
dW r,d
r−nk−s
t
=
∞∑
r=0
φ˙rt
dr−1∑
s=0
Xn+r,d
rk−s
t dt−
∞∑
r=0
r∑
i=0
φitφ
r−i
t
di−1∑
s=0
dr−i−1∑
j=0
Xn+r,d
rk−dr−is−j
t dt
+ σ
∞∑
r=n
φr−nt
dr−n−1∑
s=0
dW r,d
r−nk−s
t .
(94)
Now comparing the two Itoˆ’s decompositions (90) and (94), we obtain first the processes Zn,k;n,k;p,qt from the martin-
gale terms :
Zn,k;n,k;p,qt = σφ
p−n
t for p ≥ n and 1 ≤ q ≤ dp−n ; Zn,k;n,k;p,qt = 0, otherwise,
and we obtain second from the drift terms:
for k = 0 : φ˙0t = φ
0
t · φ0t − , φ0T = c,
for k = 1 : φ˙1t = 2φ
0
t · φ1t + d , φ1T = − cd ,
for k ≥ 2 : φ˙kt = φ0t · φkt + φ1t · φk−1t + · · ·+ φk−1t · φ1t + φkt · φ0t , φkT = 0.
(95)
This Riccati system is closely related to the one in (23) for the infinite-player directed chain game and we can have a
similar lemma.
Lemma 2. Let φ(k)t = φkt in (95) to avoid confusion. We have
∑∞
k=0 d
kφkt = 0, and the functions φ
k’s can be
obtained by a series expansion.
Proof. Given in Appendix A.9.
8.2 Catalan Markov Chain for the Directed Tree Model
Without loss of generality, we assume  = 1 and σ = 1. Following section 4, by taking T → ∞, we look at the
stationary long-time behavior of the Riccati system (95) satisfying φ˙k = 0 for all k. Then the system gives the
recurrence relation:
φ0 = 1, φ1 = − 1
2d
, and
n∑
k=0
φkφn−k = 0.
By using a moment generating function method as in Appendix A.10, we obtain the stationary solution (cf. (28)):
φ0 = 1, φ1 = − 1
2d
, and φk = − (2k − 3)!
(k − 2)!k!22k−2dk for k ≥ 2.
Let q0 = −φ0 = −1, q1 = −dφ1 = 12 , and qk = −dkφk = (2k−3)!(k−2)!k! 122k−2 for k ≥ 2. We consider the continuous-time
Markov chain with state space N and generator matrix:
Qd-tree = −

φ0 dφ1 · · · dkφk · · · · · ·
0 φ0 dφ1 · · · dkφk . . .
0 0 φ0
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 =

q0 q1 · · · qk · · ·
0 q0 q1
. . . . . .
0 0 q0
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
 = Q,
where Q is the generator matrix (29) of the continuous-time Markov chain for the infinite-player directed chain game
in section 4.
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Thus, as T →∞, the limit of the infinite particle system (92) can be rewritten as a linear stochastic evolution equation
of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type:
dXt = Qd-tree Xtdt+ dWt, t ≥ 0 (96)
where X. = (X
k
t =
∑dk−1
i=1 X
k,i
. /d
k−1, k ∈ N) with X0 = x0 and W. = (W kt =
∑dk−1
i=1 W
k,i
. /d
k−1, k ∈ N)
is a vector of averaged Brownian motions with mean 0 and variance t/dk in each generation k ∈ N. Its solution is
formally given by
Xt = e
tQd-treex0 +
∫ t
0
e(t−s)Qd-treedWs; t ≥ 0. (97)
Similar to proposition 3 and appendix A.3 and A.4, we can find the formula for X
1
t and its asymptotic variance. Proof
is shown Appendix A.11. Since by definition: X1,1t = X
1
t , then we have the following result by the Markov chain
method for the directed tree model:
Proposition 10. The formula for the root node X1,1t in (96) is:
X1,1t =
∞∑
j=1
∫ t
0
(t− s)2(j−1)
(j − 1)! · ρj−1(−(t− s)
2) e−(t−s) · dW js, t ≥ 0,
where ρi(·) is defined in (34). Moreover, the asymptotic variance of X1,1t is finite, i.e.
lim
t→∞Var(X
1,1
t ) =
√
2
2
· 1√
1 +
√
d−1
d
∈
(1
2
,
√
2
2
]
.
Remark 7. When d goes to infinity, we are in the regime of the mean field game. The asymptotic variance is 12 which
is consistent with the variance of an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process where the particle is attracted to 0 and the volatility
and the mean reversion constant are both 1.
9 Conclusion
We studied a linear-quadratic stochastic differential game on a directed chain network. We were able to identify Nash
equilibria in the case of finite chain with various boundary conditions and in the case of an infinite chain. This last
case allows for more explicit computation in terms of Catalan functions and Catalan Markov chain. The Catalan
open-loop Nash equilibrium that we obtained is characterized by interactions with all the neighbors in one direction
of the chain weighted by Catalan functions, event though the interaction in the objective functions is only with the
nearest neighbor. Under equilibrium the variance of a state converges in the infinite time limit as opposed to the
diverging behavior observed in the nearest neighbor dynamics studied in Detering, Fouque & Ichiba [3]. Our analysis
is extended to mixed games with directed chain and mean field interaction so that our game model includes the two
extreme network interactions, fully connected and only one neighbor connection. It is also extended to game on a
deterministic tree structure. Our ongoing and future research concerns games with interactions on directed tree-like
stochastic networks modeled as branching processes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 in Section 3
Define the generating function St(z) =
∑∞
k=0 z
k φ
(k)
t where 0 ≤ z < 1 with φ(k)t = φkt in (23) to avoid confusion.
Then substituting (23), we obtain
S˙t(z) =
∞∑
k=0
zkφ˙
(k)
t
=
(
φ
(0)
t φ
(0)
t − 
)
+ z
(
φ
(0)
t φ
(1)
t + φ
(1)
t φ
(0)
t + 
)
+ · · ·
+ zk
(
φ
(0)
t φ
(k)
t + φ
(1)
t φ
(k−1)
t + · · ·+ φ(k−1)t φ(1)t + φ(k)t φ(0)t
)
+ · · ·
=
(
φ
(0)
t St(z) + zφ
(1)
t St(z) + · · ·+ zkφ(k)t St(z) + · · ·
)
− + z
= (St(z))
2 − (1− z),
ST (z) = c(1− z).
(98)
• For z = 1, we get the ODE:
S˙t(1) = (St(1))
2 , ST (1) = 0. (99)
The solution is St(1) = 0, and we deduce:
∞∑
k=0
φ
(k)
t = 0, i.e., φ
(0)
t = −
∞∑
k=1
φ
(k)
t .
One needs to be careful when taking z = 1 because the series defining St(1) may not converge. Instead, we take a
sequence {zn} converging to 1, the limit of St(zn) converges to the ODE (99), and we get the conclusion.
• For z 6= 1, the solution to the Riccati equation (98) satisfies
St(z) =
−(1− z)(e2√(1−z)(T−t) − 1)− c(1− z)(√(1− z)e2√(1−z)(T−t) +√(1− z))(−√(1− z)e2√(1−z)(T−t) −√(1− z))− c(1− z)(e2√(1−z)(T−t) − 1)
=
(− (1− z)− c√(1− z)(1− z))e2√(1−z)(T−t) + (1− z)− c√(1− z)(1− z)(−√(1− z)− c(1− z))e2√(1−z)(T−t) −√(1− z) + c(1− z)
−−−−→
T→∞
√
(1− z).
(100)
A.2 Catalan Markov Chain and Proposition 3 in Section 4
We have the Catalan probabilities:
∞∑
k=1
pk = 1 and pk = 12
k−1∑
i=1
pipk−i. Then, it is easily seen that Q2 = I −B with
B having 1 ’s on the upper second diagonal and 0 ’s elsewhere, i.e.,
Q2 =

1 −1 0 · · ·
0 1 −1 . . .
. . . . . . . . .
 = −J∞(−1) , J∞(λ) :=

λ 1 0 · · ·
0 λ 1
. . .
. . . . . . . . .
 .
Here, J∞(λ) is the infinite Jordan block matrix with diagonal components λ .
The matrix exponential of Qt , t ≥ 0 , is written formally as
exp(Qt) = F (−Q2t2) = F (J∞(−1) · t2) , t ≥ 0 , F (x) := exp(−
√−x) , x ∈ C .
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Since a smooth function of a Jordan block matrix can be expressed as
F (J∞(λ)) = F (λI +B) =
∞∑
k=0
F (k)(λ)
k!
Bk =

F (λ) F (1)(λ) F
(2)(λ)
2! · · · F
(k)(λ)
k! · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
 ,
we get
exp(Qt) = F (J(−∞) · t2) = F ((−I +B)t2) =
∞∑
k=0
F (k)(−t2)
k!
(Bt2)k =
∞∑
k=0
t2kF (k)(−t2)
k!
Bk.
The (j, k) -element of exp(Qt) is formally given by
(exp(Qt))j,k =
t2(k−j) · F (k−j)(−t2)
(k − j)! , j ≤ k , where F
(k)(x) :=
dkF
dxk
(x) ; x > 0 , k ∈ N ,
and (exp(Qt))j,k = 0 , j > k for t ≥ 0 . Here the k -th derivative F (k)(x) of F (·) can be written as F (k)(x) =
ρk(x)e
−√−x , where ρk(x) satisfies the recursive equation
ρk+1(x) = ρ
′
k(x) +
ρk(x)
2
√−x ; k ≥ 0 ,
with ρ0(x) = 1 , x ∈ C . For example,
ρ0(x) = 1 , ρ1(x) :=
+1
2
(−x)− 12 , ρ2(x) := 1
4
(−x)− 22 + +1
4
(−x)− 32 ,
ρ3(x) :=
1
8
(−x)− 32 + 3
8
(−x)− 42 + 3
8
(−x)− 52 ,
ρ4(x) :=
1
16
(−x)− 42 + 6
16
(−x)− 52 + 15
16
(−x)− 62 + 15
16
(−x)− 72 ,
ρ5(x) :=
1
32
(−x)− 52 + 10
32
(−x)− 62 + 45
32
(−x)− 72 + 105
32
(−x)− 82 + 105
32
(−x)− 92 .
More generally, by mathematical induction, we may verify
ρk(x) =
1
2k
2k−1∑
j=k
(j − 1)!
(2j − 2k)!!(2k − j − 1)! (−x)
− j2 , k ≥ 1. (101)
Therefore, substituting them into (33), we obtain Proposition 3.
A.3 Proof of Remark 4 in Section 4
By ρk’s formulae in (101), we have for ν ≥ 0, k ≥ 1,
ρk(−ν2) = 1
2k
2k−1∑
j=k
(j − 1)!
(2j − 2k)!!(2k − j − 1)! =
1
2kνk
·
√
2ν
pi
· eν ·Kk−(1/2)(ν),
where Kn(x) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind, i.e.,
Kn(x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−x cosh t cosh(nt)dt ; n > −1, x > 0 .
Then, by the change of variables, we obtain
Var(X0(t)) =
∞∑
k=0
∫ t
0
(t− s)4k
(k!)2
|ρk(−(t− s)2)|2e−2(t−s)ds
=
∞∑
k=1
∫ t
0
2
pi
ν2k+1
(k!)2 4k
(
Kk−(1/2)(ν)
)2
dν +
1− e−2t
2
; t ≥ 0 .
28
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4 in Section 4
Using the following identities from the special functions∫ ∞
0
tα−1(Kν(t))2dt =
√
pi
4Γ((α+ 1)/2)
Γ
(α
2
)
Γ
(α
2
− ν
)
Γ
(α
2
+ ν
)
,
√
2
4
x
√
x2 −
√
x4 − 16 =
∞∑
k=0
(
4k
2k
)
1
2k + 1
1
x4k
, for x ≥ 2.
based on Remark 4, we obtain the limit of variance of X1t , as t→∞ , i.e., limt→∞ Var(X1t ) =
1
2
+
∞∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
2 s2k+1
pi(k!)24k
· [Kk−(1/2)(s)]2ds = 1
2
+
∞∑
k=1
2
pi (k!)24k
∫ ∞
0
s2k+1[Kk−(1/2)(s)]2ds
=
1
2
+
∞∑
k=1
2
pi(k!)24k
· pi Γ(k + 1) Γ(2k + (1/2))
8 Γ(k + (3/2))
=
1
2
+
1
2
∞∑
k=1
(
4k
2k
)
1
2k + 1
1
24k
=
1
2
∞∑
k=0
(
4k
2k
)
1
2k + 1
1
24k
=
1
2
·
√
2
4
2
√
22 − 0 = 1√
2
.
A.5 Proofs of Propositions 5- 6 in Section 4
From the expression (38) for X1t , the auto-covariance E[X
1
sX
1
t ] and the cross covariance E[X
1
tX
j+1
t ] are
E[X1sX
1
t ] =
∞∑
i=0
1
pi(i!)222i−1
∫ s
0
(t− v)i+1/2(s− v)i+1/2Ki−1/2(t− v)Ki−1/2(s− v)dv
=
∞∑
i=0
1
pi(i!)222i−1
∫ s
0
((t− s+ v)v)i+1/2Ki−1/2(t− s+ v)Ki−1/2(v)dv > 0;
E[X1tX
j+1
t ] =
∞∑
i=j
∫ t
0
1
pii!(i− j)!
(t− ν)2i−j+1
22i−j−1
Ki−1/2(t− ν)Ki−j−1/2(t− ν)dν
=
∞∑
i=0
1
pi(j + i)!j!
1
2j+2i−1
∫ t
0
sj+2i+1Kj+i−1/2(s)Ki−1/2(s)ds
−−−→
t→∞
∞∑
i=0
1
pi(j + i)!j!
1
2j+2i−1
∫ ∞
0
sj+2i+1Kj+i−1/2(s)Ki−1/2(s)ds > 0 .
(102)
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, as t→∞, the asymptotic cross covariance between X1t and Xj+1t is bounded by
lim
t→∞E[X
1
tX
j+1
t ] ≤ lim
t→∞(E[(X
1
t )
2])1/2 · (E[(Xj+1t )2])1/2 = lim
t→∞Var(X
1
t ) =
1√
2
(103)
for j ≥ 0, because X1· and Xj+1· have the same distribution.
To compute the asymptotic auto-covariance, fix s > 0 and let t → ∞. By the asymptotic expansion of the modified
Bessel function Kα(z), z > 0, there exists a positive constant c > 0 such that for every sufficiently large t(> s)
sup
i≥0
1
i! ti+1
∫ s
0
((t− s+ v)v)i+1/2Ki−1/2(t− s+ v)Ki−1/2(v)dv ≤ c · e−(t−s) .
Then combining this estimate with (102), we obtain
E[X1sX
1
t ] ≤
∞∑
i=0
4cti+1e−(t−s)
pi i! 4i
≤ 4ct
pi
e−(t−s)+(t/4) −−−→
t→∞ 0.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 7 in Section 6
Adding equations (65) and (68), for 0 < u < 1, we get:
uφ˙0t = u
2(φ0t )
2 + 2u(1− u)ψtφ0t − u(1− u)ψt
∞∑
k=0
φkt − u.
Then (67) and (68) can be written as:
uφ˙1t = 2u
2φ0tφ
1
t + 2u(1− u)ψtφ1t + u, uφ˙kt = u2
k∑
j=0
φjtφ
k−j
t + 2u(1− u)ψtφkt , for k ≥ 2.
Define St(z) =
∞∑
k=0
zkφ
(k)
t where 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 and φ(k)t = φkt in equations above to avoid confusion. Then
uS˙t(z) =
∞∑
k=0
zkuφ˙
(k)
t = u
2(St(z))
2 + u(1− u)ψtSt(z)− u(1− z),
uST (z) = u(1− z)c.
(104)
For z = 1, we obtain the ODE:
uS˙t(1) = u
2(St(1))
2 + u(1− u)ψtSt(1) , uST (1) = 0. (105)
The solution is given by St(1) = 0 and we deduce
∑∞
k=0 φ
(k)
t = 0.
A.7 About Table 1 in Section 6
From Proposition 8, for t ≥ 0 , we have:
Var(X1t ) = Var
( ∞∑
k=0
∫ t
0
uk(t− s)2k
k!
F (k)(−(t− s)2)dWk(s)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
∫ t
0
u2k(t− s)4k
(k!)2
|ρk(−(t− s)2)|2e−2(t−s)ds
=
∞∑
k=1
∫ t
0
2u2k
pi(k!)24k
ν2k+1(Kk− 12 (ν))
2dν +
1− e−2t
2
.
(106)
As t→∞, for u < 1, we obtain
lim
t→∞Var(X
1
t ) =
1
2
+
∞∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
2u2k s2k+1
pi(k!)24k
· [Kk−(1/2)(s)]2ds = 1
2
(
1− u
2
2
)− 12
<∞.
Since we have
Xjt =
∞∑
k=j
∫ t
0
uk−j(t− s)2(k−j)
(k − j)! ρk−j(−(t− s)
2) e−(t−s)dWk(s) =
∞∑
i=0
∫ t
0
ui√
pii!
(t− s)i+1/2
2i−1/2
Ki−1/2(t− s)dWj+i(s),
the (auto)covariance is:
E[X1sX1t ] =
∞∑
k=0
∫ s
0
u2k
pi(k!)222k−1
(t− ν)k+1/2(s− ν)k+1/2Kk−1/2(t− ν)Kk−1/2(s− ν)dν
=
∞∑
k=0
∫ s
0
u2k
pi(k!)222k−1
((t− s+ α)α)k+1/2Kk−1/2(t− s+ α)Kk−1/2(α)dα 6= 0.
The cross-covariance is:
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E[X1tX
k+1
t ] =
∞∑
i=k
∫ t
0
u2i−k
pii!(i− k)!)
(t− ν)2i−k+1
22i−k−1
Ki−1/2(t− ν)Ki−k−1/2(t− ν)dν
=
∞∑
j=0
uk+2j
pi(k + j)!j!
1
2k+2j−1
∫ t
0
sk+2j+1Kk+j−1/2(s)Kj−1/2(s)ds ,
and as t→∞ it converges to
∞∑
j=0
uk+2j
pi(k + j)!j!
1
2k+2j−1
∫ ∞
0
sk+2j+1Kk+j−1/2(s)Kj−1/2(s)ds (6= 0, if u 6= 0), (107)
and as in (103), we deduce the asymptotic upper bound
lim
t→∞E[X
(u)
0 (t)X
(u)
k (t)] <
1
2
(
1− u
2
2
)−1/2
.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 9 in Section 7
Define SNt (z) =
∑N−1
k=0 z
kφN,kt , then, by (85), we have:
S˙Nt (z) =
N−1∑
k=0
zkφ˙N,kt = (S
N
t (z))
2 + (1− zN )[N−2∑
j=0
zj ·
N−1∑
k=j+1
φN,kt φ
N,N+j−k
t
]− (1− z), (108)
with SNT (z) = (1− z)c. For z = 1, S˙Nt (1) = (SNt (1))2, SNT (1) = 0, and
SNt (1) =
N−1∑
k=0
φN,kt = 0, i.e., φ
N,0
t = −
N−1∑
k=1
φN,kt .
A.9 Proof of Lemma 2 in Section 8
Similar to the proof of lemma 1 in Appendix A.1, define St(z) =
∑∞
k=0 z
k ψ
(k)
t where 0 ≤ z < 1 and ψ(k)t = dkφkt
in equation (95). The Riccati system for ψ functions is given by:
for k = 0 : ψ˙(0)t = ψ
(0)
t · ψ(0)t − , ψ(0)T = c,
for k = 1 : ψ˙(1)t = 2ψ
(0)
t · ψ(1)t + , ψ(1)T = −c,
for k ≥ 2 : ψ˙(k)t = ψ(0)t · ψ(k)t + ψ(1)t · ψ(k−1)t + · · ·+ ψ(k−1)t · ψ(1)t + ψ(k)t · ψ(0)t , φ(k)T = 0.
Then similar to equation (98):
S˙t(z) =
∞∑
k=0
zkψ˙
(k)
t = (St(z))
2 − (1− z), 0 ≤ t ≤ T (109)
with ST (z) = dc(1− z). For z = 1, we get the same ODE as (99):
S˙t(1) = (St(1))
2 , ST (1) = 0. (110)
The solution is St(1) = 0. Because the series defining St(1) may not converge, we take a sequence {zn} → 1. The
limit of St(zn) converges to the ODE above, and we can get the conclusion. Then we deduce:
∞∑
k=0
ψ
(k)
t = 0, i.e.,
∞∑
k=0
dkφ
(k)
t = 0.
A.10 Stationary Solution of (95) in Section 8
Define Rt(z) =
∑∞
k=0 z
k φ
(k)
t where 0 ≤ z < 1 and φ(k)t = φkt in equation (95) to avoid confusion. Without loss of
generality, we assume  = 1. Then RT (z) = c(1− d−1z) and for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
R˙t(z) =
∞∑
k=0
zkφ˙
(k)
t =
∞∑
k=0
zk
k∑
j=0
φ
(j)
t φ
(k−j)
t − 1 +
z
d
= (Rt(z))
2 −
(
1− z
d
)
. (111)
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By taking T →∞, the constant solution of equation (111) satisfying R˙t(z) = 0 is R(z) =
√
1− zd . We can then find
constant solutions for φ functions by taking Taylor expansion and comparing it with R(z) =
∑∞
k=0 z
k φ(k), because
R(z) =
√
1− z
d
=
∞∑
k=0
( 1
2
k
)(
− z
d
)k
= 1− 1
2d
z −
∞∑
k=2
(2k − 3)!!
(2d)kk!
zk.
A.11 Solution X1t in (96) in Section 8
First, according to proposition 3, the formula for X
1
t is:
X
1
t =
∞∑
j=1
∫ t
0
(t− s)2(j−1)
(j − 1)! · ρj−1(−(t− s)
2) e−(t−s) · dW js
=
∞∑
k=0
∫ t
0
(t− s)2k
k!
· ρk(−(t− s)2) e−(t−s) · dW k+1s .
By definition, (W
k
t )0≤t≤T , k ≥ 1 are independent Brownian motions and the variance of W
k+1
s is
s
dk
. Then similar
to Appendix A.3 and A.4, we have
Var(X
1
t ) =
∞∑
k=0
∫ t
0
(t− s)4k
(k!)2
|ρk(−(t− s)2)|2e−2(t−s) · 1
dk
ds
=
∞∑
k=1
∫ t
0
2
pi
ν2k+1
(k!)2 4k
(
Kk−(1/2)(ν)
)2 · 1
dk
dν +
1− e−2t
2
; t ≥ 0 .
And
lim
t→∞Var(X
1
t ) =
1
2
+
∞∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
2 s2k+1
pi(k!)24k
· [Kk−(1/2)(s)]2 · 1
dk
ds
=
1
2
+
1
2
∞∑
k=1
(
4k
2k
)
1
2k + 1
1
24kdk
=
1
2
∞∑
k=0
(
4k
2k
)
1
2k + 1
1
(2d1/4)4k
=
1
2
·
√
2
4
2d1/4
√
4d1/2 −√16d− 16
=
√
2
2
d1/4
√√
d−√d− 1 =
√
2
2
d1/4√√
d+
√
d− 1
=
√
2
2
(
1 +
√
d− 1
d
)−1/2
∈
(1
2
,
√
2
2
]
.
The limit is monotone in d, it achieves maximum of
√
2
2 when d = 1.
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